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ments still emerge through obsolescent language. Currie's SELECTED ESSAYS demonstrate how courts have thus managed to arrive
at eminently reasonable results, hobbled though they were by a
lexicon that had not proved serviceable but had yet to be renounced.3 7
Now that judges read scholarly works as regularly as scholars
read opinions, one can be sure that Currie's extraordinary insights
will absorb many a judge hitherto baffled by conflicts. They will
note, as conduct becoming a scholar of the first rank, how forthrightly he disclaims perfection and reveals the doubts and questions
that hagride his reflection.38 No one could acknowledge more freely
that his work is work in progress. No one could set forth more
generously what he has learned, unlearned, and relearned.
It is no longer the same old fusty panorama in conflict of laws
since Brainerd Currie's landing. He arrived upon the scene unheralded and changed it grandly for the better. Every court in the
land is in his debt.
ROGER J. TRAYNOR*
RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS. By Wilber G. Katz.'
Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964. Pp.
114.
RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS: THE GREAT CONTRovEasy.

Blanshard. 2

By Paul

Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. Pp. 265.

Few areas of American law are as emotionally charged as the
relationship between government and religion. This fact renders
political solutions to many problems in the area extremely difficult,
and accentuates the importance of careful and dispassionate legal
analysis. Professor Katz's book consists of the 1963 Rosenthal lectures at Northwestern University School of Law. At that time, the
author was chairman of the National Commission on Church-State
Relations of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Although brief, the
book covers all the significant aspects of the church-state problem.
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Scholarly in the best sense, it is written in a graceful and readable
style, and on the whole constitutes one of the best treatments of the
subject I have read.
As the title suggests, there is some discussion of state constitutional decisions and provisions, but by far the larger part deals with
federal constitutional law, principally those problems arising under
the "no establishment" clause. In the first lecture, Katz summarizes
the legislative history of the clause, concluding that "the only thing
we really know about the original meaning.. is that it forbade
Congress to disestablish as well as to establish religion."3 Contrary
to the assumption of many, it would seem to follow that this is an
area in which original intention of the Founding Fathers is of little
aid in formulating a legal solution for contemporary problems.
Thus, Katz identifies the three principal positions which are advanced today as the proper meaning to be ascribed to the clause.
First, there is the Supreme Court's "no aid to religion" rule supporting the principle of full neutrality. This principle requires "the
government to be neutral not only between sects but also between
believers and nonbelievers." 4 The other two views attack the neutrality principle, but from opposite directions. One urges that government may give affirmative aid to religion so long as it does not
accord any preference to a particular religion. Another view would
require strict or absolute separation, denying even those incidental
aids resulting from measures which are not designed to promote
religion and which do not restrict their benefits to religious groups.
Katz examines these three positions in the context of Sunday closing
laws and the granting of religious exemptions, concluding in the
latter case that the neutrality principle "should not be interpreted as
forbidding all specifically religious exemptions." 5
The second lecture appraises the problem of religion and the
public schools. Katz believes that the Supreme Court's prayer and
Bible reading decisions are soundly based on the neutrality principle. He cautions, however, against applying the principle with
"pedantic absolutism." Noting the conflict between those who
would resist all religious incursions, as opposed to those who would
apply the de minimis maxim, Katz says that
a KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS

Id. at 13.
Id. at 20.

11 (1964).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 1965: 426

I do not believe that all minor religious observances in public
schools need be resisted, but only those which clearly have the
shape of an entering wedge. Indeed, I might not have criticized
the Supreme Court had they left to the supporters of religion the
job of repealing the Regents' prayer.0
In dealing with the problem of released time, Katz advocates a
balancing of "the degree of aid... against the degree of limitation
of the free exercise of religion which would result if the program
were invalidated."7 He thinks the Court was right in McCollum v.
Board of Educ.8 and wrong in Zorach v. Clauson.9 Expressing the
view (shortly thereafter affirmed by the Supreme Court) that "the
First Amendment does not forbid objective teaching about religious
beliefs in public schools so long as there is no purpose to inculcate
such beliefs,"'1 he advocates the study of religion at both private
and public schools. Conceding that the problem of maintaining
neutrality in such instruction would be more difficult at the elementary levels, he emphasizes that religious study is an important
aspect of a liberal education, particularly at the university level.
In the final lecture, Katz examines the question of state aid to
religious schools. After discussing the Everson v. Board of Educ.1
case, he states that "it is by no means clear that the 'no establishment'
clause forbids inclusion of religious schools in general aid programs.
The principle of neutrality... would permit such inclusion."12
Later, he asserts that "religious schools may not be singled out for
preferential aid, but they need not be excluded from a program of
general aid, notwithstanding the fact that their inclusion results in
indirect aid to religious teaching and practice."' 8 As a matter of
legislative policy, Katz thinks the question is not whether we should
encourage parochial schools, but whether we should continue to
discourage parochial schools.
While the government should not promote religion, it not only

may, but should, try to avoid restraining or burdening religious
choices. And if groups wish to have parish schools, there seems to
Id. at 46.
7 Id. at 48.

' 888 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction program unconstitutional).
0 348 U.S. 806 (1952) (released time program constitutional).
10 KAxz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 51-52.
1 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (school buses for parochial students constitutional).
12 KAwZ, op. cit. supra note 3, at 66.
28 d. at 74.
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me a presumption in favor of so molding government fiscal policies
as not to handicap that choice.' 4
Katz thinks the answer turns on the attitude of the Catholic church,
and hence the Catholic schools, toward the beliefs of non-Catholics
and religious liberty generally. His own answer is: "Ten years ago I
thought that the ambiguity of the Catholic stand on religious freedom might be sufficient reason for the withholding of equality in
programs of aid to education. Today, I am certain that it is not."'1
Shortly after the lectures were delivered, the Court decided the
7
6
cases of School Dist. of A bington v. Schempp, Murray v. Carlett'
and Sherbertv. Verner.'8 An epilogue discusses these decisions.
The book by Mr. Blanshard is quite different. It was written
for popular rather than professional consumption, and is consequently journalistic in style. This is not to suggest that Blanshard
is as ignorant and misleading as most journalists are when they
write of law. To the contrary, Blanshard is a lawyer himself and
handles the legal aspects in knowledgeable fashion. But the book is
not confined to legal issues. It contains a summary of the churchstate issue in American history, extended discussion of contemporary
disputation, background information about the various Supreme
Court decisions, and a sampling of the reaction to those decisions
from leading voices in press, pulpit, and politics. Appendices include the Supreme Court's prayer and Bible-reading decisions and a
list of important church-state cases.
Reading the two books together for a joint review, I was interested in the differences of opinion between Katz and Blanshard.
Most notable is their attitude toward the Catholic church. Blanshard expressed his view several years ago in a widely-discussed book,
AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER, 19 and has not departed
from that position. He therefore considers the Catholic church a
most improper recipient of government financial aid. Differing
with Katz on the constitutional issue, Blanshard states that "the
Supreme Court's opposition to across-the-board tax support for
1

' Id. at 77.

11Id. at 85.

U.S. 203 (1963) (classroom reading of Bible verses unconstitutional).
U.S. 203 (1963) (classroom reading of Bible verses and recitation of Lord's
Prayer unconstitutional).
Is 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification of Sabbatarian for unemployment benefits
unconstitutional).
10 (1958).
10374
17374
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sectarian schools is about as clear as anything can be in the absence
of a case directly in point." 20
The author appears to recognize that satisfactory solutions may
be difficult to obtain for many problems in church and state relations:
In a sense there are no solutions to these fundamental church-state
controversies .... As long as religion endures and is considered
vital by men, some continuing controversy about its relation to the
schools is as certain as the rising and the setting of the sun.
In a pluralistic society, however, there must be a modus vivendi
for church and state in the schools, a mechanism for accommodation and compromise enabling men to reduce controversy to a
minimum and to get on with the business of education in reasonable peace.21
As I read Blanshard, however, he would come close to being a member of the strict or complete separation school of thought. It is
doubtful that this approach can accurately be considered an accommodation or compromise. Furthermore, as Katz points out, "no one
can hope completely to remove religious controversy from public
life by interpreting the First Amendment in strict separation
terms.1 22 But it remains to be seen whether the neutrality principle
as applied by the Supreme Court can better minimize the conflict.
Certainly church-state questions are not ones to which there are any
easy or universally acclaimed answers. Rather, they constitute a
problem which, like so many others, must be lived with and managed
instead of finally solved.
WILLIAM P. MURPHY*

THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL OR-

By Richard A. Falk.' Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964. Pp. xvi, 184.
DER.

In recent years Professor Richard A. Falk has gained increasing
preeminence in the difficult area of international law and relations
SOBLANSHARD, REUGION AND THE SCHOOLS: THE GREAT CONTROVERSY 150
1Id.at 168.
92KATZ, op. cit. supra note 3,at 17.
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as related to problems of jurisdiction, especially pertaining to that
zone where public and private law overlap. In his recent book, he
has amalgamated and revised some of his earlier contributions to the
literature of international law as the basis for a sophisticated inquiry
into this fascinating and perhaps neglected field.
The simplest means of understanding Falk's polemical thesis, as
he phrases it, requires a definition of the concepts contained in the
book's title: domestic courts, international legal order, and the role
of those courts. By "domestic court," Falk simply means a nationally
constituted and controlled court, that is, one established under the
organizing public law of a nation-state for the purpose of applying
and developing a body of rules which it has been constitutionally
charged to administer. A fair inference from the book is that Falk
is largely concerned with appellate courts in western democratic
nations. The "international legal order" is the decentralized world
community, together with the structures, processes and procedures of
diverse and contending public order systems; the constant action and
interaction of these systems produces behavioral patterns which may
reflect universal or regional consensus on jurisdictional limitations,
usually on some basis of reasonableness. Generally speaking, Falk
clearly and succinctly restates the pioneer efforts of McDouga 12 (his
mentor) and Lasswell3 without ridiculing the many jurists who have
not understood this new approach to international law.
With these concepts in mind, Falk's view of the role of domestic
courts in the international legal order may be closely examined.
[T]he decentralized quality of international law places a special
burden upon all legal institutions at the national level. Domestic
courts are agents of a developing international legal order, as well
as servants of various national interests; this double role helps to4
overcome the institutional deficiencies on a supranational level.
Domestic courts are an area in which attitudes toward international law are disclosed and general impressions formed ....
[T]he operation of courts should be governed by the structural
characteristics of international society rather than by transient
foreign policy considerations. 5
Professor Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor of .aw, Yale University.
Professor Harold D. Lasswell, Phelps Professor of Lax% and Political Science, Yale
University.
4 FALK. rHE RoLE oF rH DoMsisc COURTS IN riE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 65
(1964).
5 Id. at 11-12.
8
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From this one might conclude that Falk is pleading merely for more
attention to the foreign element in a municipal law case which
exhibits an international law aspect. In other words, Falk may be
interpreted to mean that our principal needs are better written and
better organized opinions, with greater judicial attention to the
relationship between international and municipal law. Even this
primitive idea, if accepted, would represent an important advance
in many countries operating under the British judicial system. It
would tend to liberate the courts from antiquated dualist concepts
as well as reduce the apprehension accompanying most ventures into
the unknown terrain of public international law.
Falk, however, means much more than this. Again, in his words:
In a divided world, there will be a divided law. Under such
conditions, rules of deference applied by domestic courts advance
the development of international law faster than does an indiscriminate insistence upon applying challenged substantive norms
in order to determine the validity of the official acts of foreign
states.6
[Deference,] by which a court forecloses inquiry into the validity of challenged action by validating action simply because the
actor was a foreign state [is] ...a way of institutionalizing respect
for diverse social and economic policies, thereby affirming the possibilities of law-in the sense of stable expectations-amid antagonism.7
What Falk suggests, therefore, is the application of conflicts methods
to the area of public international law. He is dissatisfied with traditional jurisdictional principles which attempt to isolate single features of transnational problems for purposes of justifying the assertion of state control. Those methods are too artificial to cope with
modern complexities. What Falk wants is a total appraisal of the
reasonableness of every claim in order "to allow a decision-maker to
give more persuasive explanations of particular delimitations of legal
competence."" The domestic court must routinely consider at least
the main characteristics of the nature of the world community when
inquiring into the reasonableness of a jurisdictional claim. Respect
is to be accorded rival social systems that act within their own sphere
of competence. The court is not to be regarded merely as the creature of the state in which it sits.
6FALx, op. cit. supra note 4, at 6-7.
7
8

Ibid.

Id. at 33.
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These basic ideas are tested in the context of the Sabbatino case'
and the sovereign immunity concept. Although this discussion occupies a substantial portion of the book, the reviewer feels that there
has been sufficient treatment elsewhere of these topics.
How, then, is one to assess Falk's work? The book is not a major
work, but instead may be called a ballon d'essai, experimental and
stimulating. It is the introduction to a theory rather than a detailed
development of the theory itself. In this characteristic lies the main
fault of the book, for the average lawyer may not be entirely captured by the preliminary chapters devoted to the theory of things.
He will be anticipating, instead, a treatment of the relevant difficulties with which courts have been struggling. More preferable,
perhaps, would have been a short introductory statement on objects
and purposes, free of footnotes and followed by the Sabbatino and
sovereign immunity discussion. Concluding chapters could have
then examined the generalizations in light of a variety of substantive
problems. This would have given the book a reality, a sense of proportion and an impact not now evident. It would also have facilitated the application of Falk's theory to related fields.
This reviewer cannot overlook, however, the enthusiasm of his
response to Falk's ideas in this book. The dust-jacket says that he
"challenges all those who contribute to judicial outcome in international law cases before domestic courts." That is an understatement.
R.

ST.

J.
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